the 06/11/2008

Burger recall followed riskier procedures

Beef Meat

While the Topps Meat Co. churned outmillions of frozen hamburgers a month, beef ground one day wasoften stored and "reworked" with meat from another productioncycle, government documents show. A conveyor belt that moved raw patties to packaging was marred by"gouges, cracks and tears," inspectors said. They found residue onsurfaces that fresh meat came into contact with. But the plant kept operating, until an outbreak of E. coli lastsummer and fall sickened at least 40 people in eight states and ledto one of the nation's largest Beef Meats. Documents obtained by The Associated Press and interviews show thatthe now-defunct company cut back on testing for the dangerouspathogen and disregarded sanitary issues, but also that federalfood inspectors overlooked crucial evidence that Topps used riskyprocessing procedures and operated under a flawed food safety plan. "Clearly, something was missed at Topps" when the company became"complacent," Kenneth Petersen, head of the national Office ofField Operations for the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service,conceded in an interview. The documents present the most detailed picture yet of what washappening at Topps, which sold its products to Wal-Mart Stores Inc.and supermarkets and institutions such as schools, hospitals,restaurants and hotels around the country under the Topps brand aswell as several private labels. Topps had been in business for over six decades and claimed to bethe leading U.S. maker of frozen hamburgers before it closed itsplant in northern New Jersey and went out of business last yearwithin two weeks of initiating the recalls. The Centers for DiseaseControl said at least 40 people in eight states were sickened aftereating Topps beef. The recall ultimately comprised nearly 22 million pounds of beef— a year's worth of production. Former Topps executives declined or did not respond to requests forcomment on the U.S. Department of Agriculture documents, which wereobtained by The Associated Press through Freedom of Informationrequests. According to the USDA reports, regulators examining the plant inElizabeth, N.J., last fall found the company failed to test someraw meat for the potentially fatal bacteria, botched dailycleansings and ignored parts of its own operating framework. Topps did not require that every batch of meat received fromslaughterhouses be certified to be free of E. coli, inspectiondocuments show. Suppliers don't always test certain cuts, such as steaks androasts, where any bacteria would usually be on the exterior andcould be readily killed by cooking. But when Topps ground such"intact" cuts, any bacteria present was mixed into patties, whereinterior temperatures of 160 degrees during cooking would be neededto kill it. "They were doing that trimming and putting it into their groundmixture, but not doing any testing on it themselves to determine ifit had E. coli," said Petersen. "That was another avenue forpotential contamination." In a separate interview, Petersen said Topps had decreasedend-of-line testing for E. coli from monthly to three times a year."Somewhere, I don't know if lazy is the right word, but they gotcomplacent," he said. Topps recalled 332,000 pounds of hamburger on Sept. 25 afterauthorities in several states reported people becoming ill. TheUSDA inspection service suspended production the next day, citingdeficiencies in sanitation and an inadequate plan that is supposedto outline where contamination might occur and what will be done toprevent it. The plant was barred from reopening without revisingits procedures. Inspectors also questioned Topps' practice of "re-work," in whichmeat ground on one day could be added to meat during anotherproduction cycle. No law prohibits mixing different lots of beef,but food safety experts generally agree it expands the risk ofcontamination. "That is a very bad process, and hardly anyone in the industry doesthat," Petersen said. "If you want to manage E. coli in your plant,it's just not a good idea to go back in time." He said his agencyis compiling figures on how many processors nationwide use re-work. Federal inspectors also criticized sanitary measures at the plant,citing "product residues observed on product contact surfaces" and"recurring deficiencies of unsanitary equipment," including"gouges, cracks and tears" on a conveyor belt. The deadly bacteria strain, E. coli O157:H7, does not originate ingrinding plants. It is harbored mainly in the intestines of cattle,but can get into meat through improper butchering and processing.Grinding operations such as Topps are the last chance to halt thespread of E. coli before the meat is available to the public. Confronted with those findings, Topps expanded the recall on Sept.29 to 21.7 million pounds, the second-largest U.S. beef recall atthe time — although much of the meat had already been eaten. Amid an idled production line and the financial fallout from therecall, Topps closed its 67-year-old business on Oct. 5, putting 87employees out of work. In late October, the USDA inspection service identified anow-defunct Canadian slaughterhouse, Rancher's Beef Ltd. of Balzac,Alberta, as a likely source of the multistate E. coli outbreaklinked to Topps. Topps filed on Nov. 21 to liquidate in bankruptcy court, citingthousands of creditors and liabilities that far outstripped itsassets. At least three families have sued Topps, claiming relatives becameill from its hamburgers. With the company out of business, they areseeking shares of insurance payouts that could total $22 million. "The problem with Topps is it seems they had really low, lowfrequency of testing their finished hamburger product," which savedmoney, said William D. Marler of Seattle, a lawyer for two of thefamilies. "Their testing protocol really was designed never to findE. coli; never to slow the process down." Marler examined the inspection documentation at the request of theAP and said many deficiencies should have been caught. "This report clearly shows that their safety procedures and testingprocedures were definitely below par and led to this outbreak andultimately to their bankruptcy," he said. "My point is, thesethings are so obvious, where was the inspector in July and August2007?" While acknowledging that inspections could have been better, theUSDA's Petersen said that after the Topps recalls, "we put in placesome changes to make sure that doesn't happen again." The agency determined that its inspectors were properly trained,but has augmented training and data analysis as a result of theTopps case, Petersen said. For example, if a meat plant's safetyplan includes accepting only meat that has been tested, theinspectors have now been told to look for certificates for each lotthat enters the plant, he said. Petersen said he could not disclose if any discipline was takenagainst government inspectors who monitored Topps. Typically, oneinspector would be at the plant for 60 to 90 minutes during eacheight-hour production cycle, he said. The scope of the recall also prompted the USDA — which hadbeen criticized for dragging its feet — to move faster inencouraging recalls. The agency cannot issue recalls, althoughseveral lawmakers are proposing legislation in Congress that wouldgive it that authority. Marler said Petersen and others at the inspection service wereworking hard, but are hampered by an outdated meat safety system. "It really shows how the inspection is relatively antiquated,because what these inspectors are looking for is a bacteria youcan't see, taste or smell," Marler said. The nation needs to do a better job of butchering animals andtesting for E. coli at slaughterhouses, agreed Felicia Nestor,senior policy analyst at Food & Water Watch, a nonprofit consumergroup in Washington. Meat producers, meanwhile, maintain that the public interest isbest served by a broad array of measures, and that last year's risein E. coli incidents was of great concern following a steadydecline since 2001. Topps is now winding down its bankruptcy. Its assets were sold Jan.8 for more than $1.25 million, with all but $107,500 going to RBSCitizens Bank of Philadelphia, which had a secured claim because ithad loaned Topps $14.5 million. More than 5,000 other creditors, which include supermarkets andindividuals who bought burgers, have unsecured claims of about $1million. They could get a share of the $107,500, and eventually seemore money through litigation by the court-appointed trustee forTopps. Topps' president, David Cohen, declined to speak about the company. Its executive vice president, Anthony L. D'Urso, declined tocomment when presented with the USDA inspection documents at hisNew Jersey home. He is a member of the family that ran Topps forabout 60 years until Buffalo, N.Y.-based private equity firmStrategic Investments & Holdings bought a controlling interest in2003. Gary M. Brost, the president of Strategic Investments, said in ane-mail: "Counsel has advised us not to comment or discuss the ToppsMeat Co. LLC meat recall since it has resulted in litigation." Meanwhile, the former Topps plant reopened in March as OnegreatBurger Co. after an affiliate of Hawthorne-based Premio Foods, asausage maker, acquired the remainder of the Topps lease and itsflash-freezing equipment for $250,000 during the bankruptcyproceedings. "We've made it an entirely new state-of the art operation, focusedon food safety and quality products," Premio and Onegreat BurgerPresident Marc Cinque said. While D'Urso is a sales consultant, and a company associated withthe D'Urso family is the landlord, Cinque said the plant has beenrefurbished with new manufacturing equipment and the 30 employeesinclude no members of Topps management or ownership.